This article discusses the provable security of blockcipher-based hash functions. It introduces a new model called a weak ideal cipher model. In this model, an adversary is allowed to make key-disclosure queries to the oracle as well as encryption and decryption queries. A key-disclosure query is a pair of a plaintext and a ciphertext, and the reply is a corresponding key. Thus, in this model, a block cipher is random but completely insecure as a block cipher. It is shown that collision resistant hash functions can be constructed even in this weak model.
functions among them. It is also composed of a compression function using a block cipher. The designers claim that the structure of the BMW compression function is based on those of the 12 collision-resistant PGV compression functions. It is also remarkable that the underlying block cipher of the BMW compression function is weak: it is easy to compute a corresponding key for a given pair of a plaintext and a ciphertext. It implies that the block cipher of BMW is completely insecure as a block cipher.
Our Contribution. This article is inspired by the BMW compression function. It discusses the construction of compression functions using a weak block cipher, and the construction of iterated hash functions using such compression functions. A new model of an ideal primitive is introduced for the analyses, which we call a weak ideal cipher model. It is similar to the weak ideal compression function model introduced by Liskov [4] .
In the weak ideal cipher model, a block cipher E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is assumed to be a random element such that both E(K, ·) and E(·, X) are permutations for every key K and every plaintext X, where X, K ∈ {0, 1}
n . An adversary is allowed to make three kinds of queries to the oracle: encryption queries, decryption queries, and keydisclosure queries. Encryption and decryption queries are also allowed in the ideal cipher model. A key-disclosure query is a pair of a plaintext and a ciphertext, and the reply is a corresponding key.
We discuss the collision resistance (CR) in the weak ideal cipher model. We do not directly analyze the PGV compression functions. Instead of that, we analyze the compression functions in the framework by Stam [10] , and then apply the results to the PGV compression functions, because it gives us a clearer view. We give a sufficient condition for CR compression functions. We also give a sufficient condition for compression functions with which a CR hash function is obtained using the strengthened Merkle-Damgård (SMD) domain extension.
For the PGV compression functions, 8 among the 12 CR compression functions in the ideal cipher model remain CR even in the weak ideal cipher model. The MP compression function is one of the 8 compression functions. On the other hand, neither the DM nor the MMO compression functions are found to be CR in the weak ideal cipher model. Related Work. Liskov [4] introduced the weak ideal compression function model. He also proposed the zipper construction, and showed that it satisfies indifferentiability from Copyright c 2012 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers a random oracle (IRO) in this model, which implies CR. It is a non-streaming construction, and requires two independent weak compression functions. He also presented a doublepipe compression function based on the zipper construction.
The ideal cipher model dates back to Shannon, and it has been widely used in the analysis of the security of blockcipher-based hash functions [1] , [2] .
Stam [10] presented a general framework for blockcipher-based compression functions, which covers the PGV compression functions [7] . He studied the collision resistance and preimage resistance of block-cipher-based hash functions under this framework in the ideal cipher model.
Organization. Section 2 gives the definition of collision resistance and introduces the weak ideal cipher model. Section 3 discusses the collision resistance of compression functions and hash functions. Section 4 gives a concluding remark.
Definitions

Collision Resistance
Collision resistance of a block-cipher-based hash function is often discussed on the assumption that the underlying block cipher is an ideal primitive. It is mainly because the collision resistance of a hash function cannot be implied by the pseudorandomness of the underlying block cipher as a black-box [9] .
Let C be a scheme to construct a hash function or a compression function using an ideal primitive F . Let A be an adversary with access to the oracle
where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by A and the distribution of F . It can be assumed that A makes no repeated queries without loss of generality. C F is said to be collision-resistant (CR) if Adv col C F (A) is negligible for any efficient A.
Weak Ideal Cipher Model
A block cipher with block length n and key length κ is called an (n, κ) block cipher. Let E : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be an (n, κ) block cipher. We will assume that κ = n and that E has the following properties:
E is obviously insecure as a block cipher from the last property.
Actually, the second property is not essential. We will assume it, however, to make the analyses in the next section easier. Notice that the weak block cipher used in Blue Midnight Wish has this property.
In the weak ideal cipher model, the oracle first selects an element from
Both E(K, ·) and E(·, X) are permutations under the uniform distribution. An adversary makes three kinds of queries to the oracle:
• Encryption query: it is of the form (e, K, X), and the oracle returns Y.
• Decryption query: it is of the form (d, K, Y), and the oracle returns X.
• Key-disclosure query: it is of the form (k, X, Y), and the oracle returns K.
Results
Collision Resistance
This section explores the collision resistance of compression functions represented by Stam's model [10] in the weak ideal cipher model. It also discusses the collision resistance of hash functions using the compression functions and the strengthened Merkle-Damgård (SMD) domain extension. Stam's model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . C PRE is a preprocessing function:
, where M is a message block and V is a chaining variable. C POST is a postprocessing function:
, where C −PRE is the inverse of C PRE . Theorem 1 gives a set of sufficient conditions for a block-cipher-based compression function to be CR in the weak ideal cipher model. It is well-known that a CR hash function can be constructed with a CR compression function and the SMD domain extension. Then, in the weak ideal cipher model, for any collisionfinding adversary A asking at most q ≥ 1 queries to the oracle (the underlying block cipher E),
Proof Let N i be the set of positive integers smaller than i. Let (K i , X i , Y i ) be a pair of input and output of E obtained by the adversary A with the i-th query and the corresponding response from the oracle. Since C PRE is bijective, a unique input to F corresponds to (K i , X i ). Let (M i , V i ) be the input. Since A makes no repeated queries, (
Suppose that the i-th query is an encryption query (e, K i , X i ). Then, the corresponding (M i , V i ) is fixed by (K i , X i ), and the oracle returns a random reply
Suppose that the i-th query is a decryption query (d, K i , Y i ). Then, the oracle returns a random reply X i . Thus,
Suppose that the i-th query is a key-disclosure query (k, X i , Y i ). Then, the oracle returns a random reply
Since A makes at mostueries,
Theorem 2 gives a set of sufficient conditions for a block-cipher-based compression function with which a CR hash function is constructed using the SMD domain extension in the weak ideal cipher model.
Theorem 2
Let H be a hash function constructed with the SMD domain extension and a block-cipher-based compression function F : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n in Stam's model. Suppose that F satisfies the following conditions:
Then, in the weak ideal cipher model, for any collisionfinding adversary A asking at most q ≥ 1 queries to the oracle (the underlying block cipher E),
Proof The notations in the proof of Theorem 1 are also used here. Suppose that A eventually finds a collision for the hash function with the i-th query. Let W i = F(V i , M i ) and IV be the initial value of the hash function. Then, it is necessary for A to encounter one of the following events:
• W i depends on the reply from the oracle, and it collides with W j or V j for some j ∈ N i .
• V i depends on the reply from the oracle, and it collides with IV or W j for some j ∈ N i .
Suppose that the i-th query is (e, K i , X i ). Then, the cor-
.
Suppose that the i-th query is
On the other hand, if the mapping from X to V defined by
Suppose that the i-th query is (k,
If the mapping from
Since A makes at most q ≥ 1 queries,
Notice that the conditions 1, 2, 3(a) and 4(a) in Theorem 2 are identical with the conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table 1 20 PGV compression functions for CR hash functions in the ideal cipher model [1] . M is a message block, and V is a chaining variable. Z = M ⊕ V. c is a constant. "1" indicates that the corresponding compression function satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1. "2" indicates that the corresponding compression function satisfies the conditions in Theorem 2, but does not satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1. "×" indicates that the corresponding compression function does not satisfy the conditions in Theorem 2 (nor in Theorem 1).
Theorem 1, respectively.
PGV Compression Functions
We will see the implications of Theorems 1 and 2 for the PGV compression functions. They are summarized in Table 1 . Among the twelve CR compression functions in the ideal cipher model (h 1 through h 12 ), eight functions labeled with "1" remain CR even in the weak ideal cipher model. The MP compression function (h 3 ) belongs to this class. Nine compression functions labeled with "2" are not CR by themselves. However, hash functions using them and the SMD domain extension are CR in the weak ideal cipher model. The MMO compression function (h 1 ) belongs to this class. In contrast, CR hash functions cannot be constructed with h 5 , h 15 nor h 16 , where h 5 is the DM compression function.
Concluding Remark
This work is inspired by a SHA-3 candidate BMW. However, the results do not seem to have direct implications in its security. For example, the security of BMW also seems to depend on the preprocessing and postprocessing functions. They are as complex as the underlying weak block cipher.
The results in this article still suggest that some PGV compression functions may compensate it if any vulnerability is found in the underlying block cipher as far as CR is concerned.
